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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
Time: 2:42 am
Time: 2:42 am
Results for bail bonds
5 results foundAuthor: Brooker, Claire M.B. Title: The Jefferson County Bail Project: Impact study found better cost effectiveness for unsecured recognizance bonds over cash and surety bonds Summary: In early 2010, Jefferson County, Colorado, conducted a Bail Impact Study, which was a pilot project to determine, among other things, the impact of using fewer secured money bonds on four bail outcomes: (1) public safety; (2) court appearance; (3) compliance with supervision; and (4) pretrial jail use. This study was part of the larger Jefferson County Bail Project, a comprehensive undertaking to understand and improve the County's bail administration. Results showed that the increased use of secured financial conditions of bond did not enhance court appearance, public safety, or compliance with other conditions of supervision. Secured bonds did, however, increase pretrial jail bed use. These findings suggest that when secured money bonds are set, it results in higher taxpayer cost with no public safety, court appearance, or compliance with supervision benefits. Details: Washington, DC: Pretrial Justice Institute, 2014. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 14, 2014 at: http://www.pretrial.org/download/pji-reports/Jeffersion%20County%20Bail%20Project-%20Impact%20Study%20-%20PJI%202014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.pretrial.org/download/pji-reports/Jeffersion%20County%20Bail%20Project-%20Impact%20Study%20-%20PJI%202014.pdf Shelf Number: 133074 Keywords: Bail (Colorado)Bail BondsPretrial Release |
Author: Illinois. Supreme Court. Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts Title: Circuit Court of Cook County Pretrial Operational Review Summary: For decades, the highly publicized issue of jail over-crowding has plagued Cook County. Through the years, experts have examined Cook County's pretrial and bond court operations, studied crime statistical data, and recorded remedies, some of which resulted in operational, environmental, programmatic, and policy changes with varying effects. From the point of arrest through the pretrial and bond court process, there is a critical dilemma that persists: whether to allow the defendant to remain in the community and continue to work and attend school, or to detain the defendant and alleviate any risk of failing to appear or committing another crime while awaiting trial. Ultimately, judicial discretion determines such decisions based upon the facts presented to the judge during bond court. The Illinois Pretrial Services Act provides the legal framework for this process. In practice, it has become largely aspirational, rather than a model for everyday procedure. Under the Act, pretrial services would provide a pivotal function in collecting and verifying information to be used by the judge to determine bond and release conditions, and in providing post-release supervision as a means to respond to non-compliance with court conditions while awaiting trial. In 2013, Cook County pretrial services staff conducted 24,977 interviews/assessments and conducted 7,164 intakes on defendants ordered to pretrial supervision as reported through monthly statistical reports submitted to the Administrative Office. Unfortunately, however, the reliance upon the work of pretrial services is generally dismissed or minimized because of a lack of confidence in the credibility of the risk assessment and community living information. During this operational review, it was evident that much of the information obtained by pretrial services officers was not verified, so the response from stakeholders and judges was understandable. Though a series of technological, managerial, interpersonal, and operational factors were substantiated during the review process and described in this document, there is no single group, program or "fix" that accounts for the fracture of the process. Notwithstanding, while there was non-reliance upon the risk assessment and other information and a limited number of cases placed under pretrial supervision, this was juxtaposed by judges overwhelmingly voicing support for pretrial services personnel and the need for the program. Further, collection of statistical reports and other data has been cumbersome and inconsistent due to antiquated technology, unfamiliarity with the scope of data collected by respective stakeholder groups, absence of a coordinated data sharing process, and to a degree, data request protocols. Therefore, the data presented in this report is limited to that reported to the Administrative Office through the Adult Probation Department monthly statistical pretrial reports, data reported by the Cook County Circuit Court Clerk as contained in the Annual Statistical Reports to the Supreme Court, and publications prepared by Loyola University professor/researcher on the jail population for the Cook County Sheriff's Reentry Council Research Bulletin. Data requests submitted to the Circuit Clerk's office, Pretrial Services and the Sheriff's department have been submitted by the Administrative Office and are pending. While the impetus to conduct this review was a request by Chief Judge Evans for the funding of additional pretrial positions, such consideration must also be accompanied by systemic change. The two must not be separate. Unless there is a commitment amongst stakeholders to delve into these issues, reach consensus of resolutions and act to implement collaborative organizational and operational policies and practices in the pretrial and the bond court process, strictly adding positions will be minimally effective. While challenges exist, this is also a time of great opportunity. Many positive partnerships and activities are underway in Cook County that foster institutionalizing change and favorable outcomes. These include the Cook County Integrated Criminal Justice Information Systems Committee (CCICJIS) and the plan to move from a paper-based to electronic systems of data exchange and sharing among stakeholders; the joint meetings of Cook County elected officials that are fleshing out issues and solutions to the process; the planned evaluation of the bond court process that will provide baseline performance data in Central Bond Court (CBC); and the Administrative Office's initiative, in conjunction with a notable national research team, to validate a statewide pretrial risk assessment tool. Details: Chicago, IL: Illinois Supreme Court, Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts, 2014. 138p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 18, 2015 at: https://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Reports/Pretrial/Pretrial_Operational_Review_Report.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Reports/Pretrial/Pretrial_Operational_Review_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 134952 Keywords: Bail BondsCourts (U.S.)Judicial DiscretionPretrial DetentionPretrial ReleasePretrial Services (Illinois)Risk Assessment |
Author: Zambia. Human Rights Commission Title: A Survey Report on the Application of Bond and Bail Legislation in Zambia Summary: This survey was conducted to collect information on factors affecting access and conditions regarding bail among people found to be in conflict with the law in Zambia. The survey was conducted for a period of six months in all ten provinces of the country. The findings of this study are meant to provide a basis for the review of current bail legislation relating to bail conditions in Zambia by promoting easy access for suspects or inmates to bail regardless of their social and economic conditions. The target respondents for the surveys were inmates in prisons, police officers in charge of a police station, magistrates and public prosecutors. The survey also examined the current committal process of matters to the High Court and the transfer process of matters to other courts so as to determine causes of delays in the two processes. A total of 2,168 respondents were interviewed in this survey. The findings reveal that on average suspects in Zambia are kept in police custody for fourteen days before they are made to appear before the court. The survey has shown that in Lusaka suspects were kept in police custody for about 22 days. Eastern province had the least detention days of 6 days. Another key finding is that about 30% of the remandees indicated that they have been awaiting judgment for a period of over one year. Two- thirds said they have been awaiting judgment for a period of less than one month. Nearly 6% have been waiting for judgment for at least 9 months. The survey also revealed several reasons explaining why few suspects attempted applying for bail. The reasons brought forward included suspects lack of knowledge that they can apply for police bond or bail and; suspects having no working sureties to sign police bond for them. The survey revealed that bail conditions in Zambia are stringent, requiring suspects to provide two working sureties as a condition for granting of bail. Findings also showed that time taken for cases to be committed to the High Court can be inordinately long as can be the rendering of judgments. The survey thus revealed that there were challenges at every stage of the criminal justice process that hindered accused persons' enjoyment of their due process rights. In this regard, the Commission found that the criminal justice system has more often than not failed in its function of ensuring that the rights of the accused are protected with the country falling short of the principles enunciated in the international standards to which it is a party. There is therefore need for a thorough review of the existing law regarding the bail and police bond conditions in Zambia as well as the law and processes that regulate the committal of cases to the High Court. In addition to this is the need for sensitisation of the citizenry on the rights to bond and bail in Zambia. Chapter 1 focuses on the problem statement and situational analysis. It further speaks to the survey objectives and methodology used. Chapter 2 focuses on the law relating to bail and committal in Zambia. It demonstrates the relationship between human rights and criminal justice; the law relating to bail and committal; preliminary inquires; survey procedures and committal sentencing. In Chapter 3 of the report, the findings of the survey are discussed. These relate to the demographic characteristics of the respondents, arbitrary and over detention of suspects, the issue of legal representation and judgement. The findings reveal the bail and bond conditions, bail during trial, reasons for the court not granting bail and the process of transfer of cases from the lower court for committal to the high court. Finally Chapter 4 concludes with recommendations from the Human Rights Commission regarding the need for reform in the legal and justice system and specifically regarding bail and police bond and the committal process. Details: Lusaka: Human Rights Commission, 2014. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 22, 2016 at: http://www.osisa.org/sites/default/files/survey_report_hrc_zambia_2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Zambia URL: http://www.osisa.org/sites/default/files/survey_report_hrc_zambia_2014.pdf Shelf Number: 145587 Keywords: Bail BondsCriminal CourtCriminal Justice SystemCriminal ProcedureDue ProcessHuman RightsPretrial Release |
Author: Utah. Legislative Auditor General Title: A Performance Audit of Utah's Monetary Bail System Summary: This audit reviews the effectiveness of the two types of monetary bail commonly offered in Utah's district courts: cash bail and surety bond. Cash bail involves a payment to the courts that is refunded to the defendant if not convicted, or if convicted, could be forfeited and applied to court-related fees. Surety bond involves a non-refundable premium, typically 10 percent of the full bail amount, paid to a commercial surety (a.k.a. bail bond agency). Since the primary objectives of bail are to assure court appearance and community safety, this audit compares the effectiveness of the two monetary bail types in assuring court appearances. Court appearance data also led us to review evidence-based pretrial release practices that enhance community safety as well as the surety bond forfeiture process. Details: Salt Lake City: Utah Office of the Legislative Auditor General, 2017. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Report No. 2017-01: Accessed February 21, 2017 at: https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=ce65ff35-ba9c-77fb-8922-b9417faecd6e Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=ce65ff35-ba9c-77fb-8922-b9417faecd6e Shelf Number: 147376 Keywords: BailBail BondsPretrial Release |
Author: Daniels, Flozell, Jr. Title: From Bondage to Bail Bonds: Putting a Price on Freedom in New Orleans Summary: Bail in Louisiana was once a system that enforced a constitutional right to be free after arrest and before a determination of guilt or innocence. Over time, it has been transformed into a money bail system in which that freedom is conditioned on the ability to pay money up front. What was originally designed as a right to pretrial freedom has become a means of control and extracting money from people who are arrested, and jailing those who cannot pay. The money bail system takes $6.4 million from New Orleans families each year, with over $1 million going to the court, $227,000 to each of three other agencies (the sheriff, district attorney, and public defender offices), and $4.7 million to commercial bail bond companies.1 For those whose families cannot afford to pay the price of pretrial freedom, the non-financial costs are even greater. Many poor and low income people stay in jail until their cases are resolved, regardless of the seriousness of the charges or the likely outcome of the case. In fact, most arrests and detention do not lead to a conviction with a sentence of incarceration; most plead guilty and are sentenced to probation or to the time they've already served before conviction. As a result, the only incarceration most people end up serving is the pretrial detention they suffer because of the requirement that they pay to gain their freedom, despite being legally innocent. Once their cases are resolved, most are released. The length of this money-based detention can be devastating. Those who cannot afford to pay bail stay in jail nearly four months while facing a felony charge and nearly one month for a municipal or state misdemeanor charge until their case is resolved. Even those who were able to pay bail were jailed an average of 11 days for a felony and three days for a misdemeanor before being freed. More than 500 people were in jail on any given day in 2015 for no other reason than that they could not afford to pay cash or purchase a bail bond. There are also enormous costs to the city's taxpayers, who pay more than $6 million each year to subsidize the cost of unnecessarily jailing these 500 people. People who are arrested in New Orleans are often poor-85 percent are too poor to hire a lawyer. They are also disproportionately black; black people are arrested at two and a half times the rate of white people. Fully 84 percent of the $6.3 million paid in money bail is paid by black people. Worse yet, black people are less likely to be able to pay the price set for their freedom; average income for black households is $25,324 while for white households it is $67,884.9 Consequently, most of the people in the jail-87 percent-are black. The money bail system intrinsically harms those least able to afford it, whether by extracting scarce dollars or jailing those with insufficient dollars to pay. Black people, whether subject to implicit biases or by virtue of being economically disadvantaged, suffer the greatest harm. New Orleans has led all U.S. cities in jailing its people. Why does a majorityblack city pursue policies and practices that lead to the jailing of black people at starkly higher rates than people of other races? Why does this city-300 years old, half of that post-emancipation-continue to exact the heavy human toll of conditioning freedom on the ability to pay the price set? One place to look for answers is in the historical practices of exploitation of people of color, driven or sanctioned by the state, that trade on the fiction of black dangerousness and criminality to extract revenue and exert control. This essay examines the extent to which money bail in New Orleans is a descendant of slavery and subsequent practices of racial exploitation. It describes bail and related practices across the city's 300-year history, identifying echoes in the present-day regime of money bail. It then explains the processes and costs of modern money bail. Finally, it presents some ways in which the city has been moving to a less harmful criminal legal system and offers models from jurisdictions that have rejected money-based detention as inconsistent with the core principle of innocent until proven guilty. Details: New Orleans: The Data Center, 2018. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2018 at: https://s3.amazonaws.com/gnocdc/reports/Daniels_bondage_to_bail_bonds.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://s3.amazonaws.com/gnocdc/reports/Daniels_bondage_to_bail_bonds.pdf Shelf Number: 150194 Keywords: Bail BondsPovertyPretrial JusticePretrial ReleaseRacial Disparities |